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Divine Foreknowledge and the Problem of Evil 
Four Views 
In America’s modern Western context, people do not respect religion. In fact, many 
people openly mock and despise religion for its influence on society. However, most criticism of 
religion is directed toward Christianity, which has had the greatest influence on culture for the 
past 1,500 years. One reason why many atheists are too afraid to criticize Islam is fear of 
physical harm, but because Christianity promotes free speech and open discourse, they fearlessly 
attack what they perceive to be a “backward” mentality toward science. Another massive 
objection to Christianity is the “problem of evil,” which proposes that if God is all-loving and 
all-powerful, then He wants and has the ability to stop evil. However, even though God is all-
loving and all-powerful, there is a prevalent amount of evil throughout the world. Therefore, 
atheists claim that either God is not omnibenevolent, is impotent, or does not exist. Furthermore, 
Christians must also explain divine foreknowledge. If God knows the future, then why does He 
not stop these evil things from happening? 
 Over the past 1,500 years, theologians, philosophers, and pastors have adopted four 
primary stances regarding divine foreknowledge. Some people turn to Open Theism, a more 
recent development that emphasizes scriptures which seem to limit God’s foreknowledge in 
order to help maintain human free will and answer the problem of evil. Others adopt 
Arminianism, which holds that God knows the future exhaustively but humans continue to have 
free will. A smaller group adheres to Molinism, which uses God’s “middle knowledge” (i.e. His 
knowledge of how humans freely act in certain situations) as a defense against skeptics. Finally, 
a majority of people subscribe to Calvinism, which believes that God has already determined the 
outcome of world events for His glory and divine purposes. These four viewpoints each have 
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unique advantages for their proponents, and all four attempt to maintain the inerrancy of 
Scripture and defend orthodox Christian doctrine (i.e. God’s omniscience, omnipresence, 
omnibenevolence, etc.). This paper will summarize each group’s definition of divine 
foreknowledge and then explain how that view affects their answer to the problem of evil. The 
author will begin by discussing the most controversial position: Open Theism. 
 A common criticism of Open Theism is that it denies God’s omniscience, and that it 
trades part of God’s essential nature for a more relatable version of Him. However, Gregory 
Boyd disagrees with this notion. Open Theists agree with Arminians, Molinists, and Calvinists 
that God is omniscient. Boyd argues instead that, “the debate over God’s foreknowledge is rather 
a debate over the content of reality that God perfectly knows.”1 Calvinists, Arminians, and 
Molinists say that the future is eternally settled, meaning that future events are eternally known 
as settled facts in God’s mind. Conversely, Open Theists claim that the future contains both 
settled and open aspects. Boyd writes that God “knows the possible aspects as possible and 
knows the settled aspects as settled. … the sovereign Creator settles whatever He wants to settle 
about the future … He leaves open whatever He wants to leave open, and hence He perfectly 
foreknows the future as possible to this extent.”2  
Boyd claims that if God knows the future decisions of human beings, then humans do not 
have the actual ability to do otherwise, thereby eliminating our free will. Therefore, in order to 
maintain our freedom, God leaves the future open in regard to human choices. However, in cases 
like Jesus’s crucifixion, God can decide to solidify the occurrence of future events. He knows the 
event will happen, but He does not know who will cause it to happen. The other positions will 
                                                     
1. Gregory A. Boyd, “The Open-Theism View”, in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, eds. James K. 
Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2001), 13. 
  
2. Ibid., 14. 
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criticize Open Theism at this point, claiming that scriptures like Matthew 26:33-35 contradict 
this view. In this passage, Jesus predicts that Peter will reject him three times before the rooster 
crows. Open Theists respond by emphasizing God’s perfect knowledge of the past and present. 
Because Jesus perfectly knew Peter’s character, and Peter had the character trait of “superficial 
boldness,” Jesus was able to accurately predict that Peter would deny him.  
This heavy reliance on free will is Open Theism’s main response to the problem of evil. 
In the Open Theist mindset, love and freedom necessarily go together. Boyd proclaims that 
“God’s anthropological purpose in creating the world was to express His eternal nature by 
sharing His eternal, other-oriented triune love with us.”3 Because love is the goal of creation, 
Boyd argues that humans must have free will. Genuine love does not coerce another individual, 
so “we can only conclude that God gave us the capacity freely to reject His loving will because it 
was necessary for love.”4 However, Boyd accepts that our actions are affected by natural forces, 
other human beings, or even our own desires. He concedes that “as important as free will is to 
the open model of providence, it does not naïvely deny that the scope of free will is significantly 
restricted.”5 
How does God deal with natural disasters, disease, and other harmful events outside of 
human responsibility? Open Theists say that God plans ahead of time how He will respond to 
any possible event. Boyd claims that God knows counterfactuals of divine freedom, meaning 
God knows what He would do in any circumstance. Boyd explains the implications of this in his 
essay: “God can anticipate and prepare for each and every possibility as effectively as if it was a 
                                                     
 3. Gregory A. Boyd, “God Limits His Control,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, eds. Stanley N. 
Gundry and Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 188. 
 
 4. Ibid., 190. 
 
 5. Ibid., 192. 
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certainty. … While not everything happens for a divine purpose … everything happens with a 
divine purpose, for God has from eternity been preparing a response to each and every possible 
event in case it takes place.”6 Even though God does not actually know the outcome of future 
events, Open Theists believe Christians can still be confident that He will bring about the best 
possible world for us. 
Next, Arminianism claims that God has complete and infallible knowledge of the future. 
Unlike Open Theism, Arminians claim that God knows the future actions of human beings, but 
this does not eliminate our ability to have libertarian freedom. In his essay, David Hunt answers 
two critiques of the Arminian view: The Problem of Human Freedom and the Problem of Divine 
Agency. The Problem of Human Freedom states that God’s infallible foreknowledge eliminates 
our ability to have genuine free will. Hunt responds by echoing the words of St. Augustine:  
It is true that God’s foreknowing Adam’s action, like His causing Adam’s action, leaves 
Adam with no alternatives … But the mere absence of alternate possibilities is irrelevant. 
Causing, forcing or coercing someone interferes with that person’s agency; simply 
knowing what the person will do is not an interference of any sort, and its implications 
for free agency are benign.7 
 
The Problem of Divine Agency says that if God knows everything that will happen, then 
He cannot decide or intend to do anything, and thus remains impotent. However, Hunt offers two 
criticisms of this argument. First, God does not need to acquire an intention to do something. 
Hunt insists that “Whatever intentions God has, He presumably has them from eternity, just as 
He has His knowledge from eternity. So there is no time at which God knows what He is going 
to do but hasn’t yet formed the intention to do so.”8 Second, the argument fails to make a 
                                                     
 6. Ibid., 206-207. 
  
7. David Hunt, “The Simple-Foreknowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, eds. James K. 
Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2001), 88. 
  
 8. Ibid., 93.  
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distinction between propositional beliefs, which are about what will happen, and practical 
beliefs, which are about what someone decides to do. Hunt argues that “What makes God or 
anyone an agent is the power to decide what to do. God’s omniscience does not deprive him of 
this power, since it determines only his propositional beliefs, leaving his practical beliefs—the 
ones open to agency—wide open.”9  
Because Arminians find no contradiction between God’s complete foreknowledge and 
human freedom, they have to provide answers to the problem of evil that Open Theists can 
avoid. Nevertheless, Arminians have four main responses to the problem of evil.10 First and 
foremost, Arminians support the Free Will theodicy. Similar to Boyd’s defense, Arminians claim 
that humans need free will to genuinely love or trust one another. However, once they have free 
will, humans also have the opportunity to do evil. Despite this, because God loves us, He allows 
us to have free will. Second, Arminians appeal to the Laws of Nature theodicy. The physical 
laws that govern the universe are crucial to our understanding of the world. However, these same 
physical laws cause suffering as well as good: The same water that refreshes us can drown us, or 
the same nerves that give us pleasure can cause pain. Therefore, in order to have the good of 
regular laws, the possibility of harmful effects from these laws is required.  
Third, Arminians appeal to the Soul-Making theodicy. Virtues such as endurance, 
courage, faithfulness, and patience make humanity better persons. In order to obtain these 
virtues, humanity often must engage in conflict and temptation. God could not have given 
humans these virtues, for their value is in the struggle of obtaining of them and not simply 
having them. However, the existence of an environment which will help humanity obtain these 
                                                     
9. Ibid., 95-96. 
  
10. These responses come from a lecture given by Mark Foreman at Liberty University in April 2015 titled 
“Introduction to Philosophy: Apologetics—The Problem of Evil.” 
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virtues will also result in failures and real loss. Fourth, Arminians appeal to the purpose of 
suffering. Although we may not know the purpose behind each individual period of suffering, the 
reality of a purpose is still possible. We do know that suffering does fulfill some good that would 
probably not come about without suffering.  These include warning us of greater suffering, 
keeping us from self-destruction, or helping us defeat other evils. These four responses provide 
Arminianism with a worthy arsenal of intellectual defenses against the problem of evil. 
Now the author will examine Molinism, which claims that God has “middle knowledge.” 
In order to explain what “middle knowledge” is, terms must be defined. First, we must define the 
types of knowledge God has. God has natural knowledge, which is all necessary truths, including 
possible worlds, and free knowledge, which is contingent truths about the actual world.  Next, 
“counterfactuals” are conditional statements in the subjunctive mood (e.g. “If I were tall, I would 
play basketball.”) All Christian theologians have agreed that God’s omniscience includes 
counterfactual knowledge, but they disagree about where this occurs in the logical order of 
God’s creative decree. Dominicans believed God’s counterfactual knowledge was subsequent to 
God’s decree, whereby God declares what counterfactuals are true. Conversely, Jesuits, 
including Luis de Molina (after whom Molinism is named), believed God’s counterfactual 
knowledge was prior to His decree. William Lane Craig explains why this is so important: 
Thus, by employing His counterfactual knowledge, God can plan a world down to the last 
detail and yet do so without annihilating creaturely freedom, since what people would 
freely do under various circumstances is already factored into the equation by God. Since 
God’s counterfactual knowledge lies logically in between his natural knowledge and his 
free knowledge, Molinists called it God’s middle knowledge.11 
 
However, Craig also makes a necessary distinction between himself and Gregory Boyd. While 
Boyd claims that God knows counterfactuals of divine freedom but leaves open counterfactuals 
                                                     
 11. William Lane Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, eds. 
James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2001), 122. 
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of human freedom, Craig claims the opposite. Craig believes that God knows counterfactuals of 
human freedom, but if God knew what He would do in any situation, it would limit His own 
sovereignty. Therefore, he proposes that counterfactuals of divine freedom obtain truth-value at 
the same moment as God’s creative decree.12 
So how does “middle knowledge” affect the Molinist response to the problem of evil?13 It 
gives Molinists a unique form of the Free Will defense. Some skeptics maintain that it is 
logically impossible for God and evil to coexist. However, this claim contains a hidden 
assumption: If God is all-powerful, He can create any world He wants. However, this is not true, 
and Craig proves this by differentiating between logically possible worlds and feasible worlds. 
There is an infinite number of logically possible worlds. For instance, it is logically possible that 
Adam would not have sinned in the Garden of Eden. By contrast, feasible worlds are worlds God 
can actualize given the free actions of humans. Therefore, because God knew Adam would freely 
choose to sin, the logically possible world where Adam did not sin became unfeasible. The idea 
of feasible worlds allows Molinists to maintain that this is the best world God could create. 
Craig also deals with the Probabilistic Problem of Evil, where the statement “God is all-
powerful and all-loving” seems improbable relative to the statement, “Evil exists.”  He first 
responds by saying that due to our limited knowledge as finite persons, we are not in the position 
to claim that God lacks good reasons for permitting evil. Furthermore, relative to the full 
evidence, God’s existence is probable. Here he offers several arguments for the existence of 
God: The Ontological Argument, which argues that God necessarily exists based upon His being; 
                                                     
12. William Lane Craig, “God Directs All Things,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, eds. Stanley N. 
Gundry and Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 82 n. 1. 
 
 13. This page draws from a lecture by William Lane Craig at Aalborg University on April 17, 2012 titled 
“The Problem of Suffering and Evil.” 
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The Kalam Cosmological Argument, which argues that the universe must have a cause, and that 
cause must be God; and The Moral Argument, which argues that objective moral values and 
duties can only be grounded in God. Finally, Craig says that Christianity entails doctrines that 
increase the probability of the co-existence of God and suffering. The view that the chief purpose 
of life is not happiness, but rather that the knowledge of God is an “incommensurable good,” 
allows us to withstand suffering while maintaining faith in Christ. 
 Finally, the author will examine Calvinism, which states that God determines what will 
happen in the future. Paul Helm views God’s foreknowledge in primarily two senses. First, he 
sees God’s knowledge as the cause of all things: “On this view there would appear to be no 
distinction between what God causes and what he permits, because, on Aquinas’s view, since 
God foreknows all events, he must cause them all.”14 Second, he sees God’s foreknowledge as 
logically subsequent to His creative decree: “On this view God’s decree is all embracing, and his 
foreknowledge is simply his knowledge of what he has decreed before that decree takes effect in 
time.”15 Based upon these two views, Calvinists agree that God determines the actions of all 
humans, but that they still maintain responsibility for their actions. This view of human freedom 
is called “compatibilism.” 
 Helm offers three separate arguments for the Calvinist view of divine foreknowledge and 
compatibilist freedom. First, he argues from the Calvinist doctrine of irresistible grace. The 
argument can be formulated like this: Irresistible grace is efficacious, while incompatibilism and 
resistible grace find no need for efficacious grace. But only efficacious grace ensures the 
salvation of a person, so incompatibalist freedom directly contradicts a central Christian doctrine. 
                                                     
 14. Paul Helm, “The Augustinian-Calvinist View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, eds. James K. 
Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2001), 163. 
 
 15. Ibid. 
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Therefore, Christians need compatibilism to support efficacious grace. Second, God’s knowledge 
of all past, present, and future events is most at home with compatibilism. Third, Helm draws 
upon temporal necessity.  
If there is something in the past that entails something in the future and if what is past is 
necessary—accidentally or historically necessary—then what is entailed is similarly 
accidentally or historically necessary … If this is so, then someone’s free act must 
necessarily occur and therefore cannot be free. But if this is so, then divine omniscience 
is inconsistent with human incompatibilist freedom.16 
 
If God determines all things, including human actions, then how does God not become the author 
of evil? Helm offers a response by saying God does not cause, but willingly permits evil actions 
to occur: 
God foreknows future evil by knowingly and willingly permitting particular evil actions. 
… God does not and cannot will evil actions, but he may nevertheless know that they will 
occur and be willing for them to occur. In permitting evil in this way God acts for the 
highest and holiest reasons even though the detail of such reasons may be at present 
hidden from us.17 
 
Helm defines willing permission this way: “for action A to be the action of someone other than 
X; for X to foreknow the occurrence of A and to have been able to prevent A; and for A not to be 
against X’s overall plan.”18 Helm holds that if an evil action is committed by a human, and God 
permits it to happen for some larger purpose, then He is not responsible for the evil that 
occurred. Likewise, Turretin appeals to the mysterious nature of God’s sovereignty and human 
freedom: 
That God on the one hand by his providence not only decreed but most certainly secures 
the event of all things, whether free or contingent; on the other hand, however, man is 
always free in acting and many effects are contingent. Although I cannot understand how 
these can be mutually connected together, yet (on account of ignorance of the mode) the 
                                                     
 16. Helm, “The Augustinian-Calvinist View,” 185-186. 
 
 17. Ibid., 176. 
 
 18. Ibid. 
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thing itself is (which is certain from another source, i.e., from the word) not either to be 
called in question or wholly denied.19 
 
The Calvinist must faithfully believe that God cannot cause evil, even if they do not understand. 
 As the author has quickly examined the views of Open Theism, Arminianism, Molinism, 
and Calvinism, he hopes the reader has seen how each theological position uniquely approaches 
the subject of divine foreknowledge and the problem of evil. However, each of these views has 
weaknesses and, depending on the reader’s opinion, fatal flaws. For instance, Hunt criticizes 
Open Theism by saying that it reduces God to making probability estimates. Furthermore, it 
seems implausible for Jesus to exactly predict Peter’s three denials from a character trait. 
Similarly, Arminians are criticized for hastily generalizing Scripture and misreading Augustine’s 
argument in Freedom of the Will; Molinists are criticized for improperly characterizing the 
Calvinist position and failing to provide evidence for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom; and 
Calvinists are criticized for leaving God as the author of evil and denying human responsibility 
by invoking universal, divine determinism. Basically, we find that every stance regarding divine 
foreknowledge and the problem of evil is debatable. Nevertheless, whatever position they 
subscribe to, all Christians must agree that there are answers to these tough questions. Peter 
exhorts us to “sanctify Christ as Lord in your hearts, always being ready to make a defense to 
everyone who asks you to give an account for the hope that is in you, yet with gentleness and 
reverence.”20 No matter our theological persuasion, we must unite under the cross of Christ and 
spread the truth of the gospel. 
  
                                                     
19. Turretin, quoted by Paul Kjoss Helseth, “God Causes All Things,” in Four Views on Divine 
Providence, eds. Stanley N. Gundry and Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 41. 
  
20. 1 Peter 3:15 (NASB). 
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